Abstract-Modern infrastructures involve a large population of heterogeneous users or agents in a complex network who strategically make dynamic decisions. In this work, we connect evolutionary games with Poisson games to establish an evolutionary Poisson game framework to capture the random, dynamic and heterogeneous interactions of agents in a holistic fashion. We introduce the notion of evolutionary Poisson stable equilibrium for the game, and show its existence and uniqueness. To illustrate the framework, we use epidemic protection problem as a case study to provide cyber security solutions using the developed framework. In addition, we design online algorithms to control large population behaviors to achieve a system-wide objective based on the techniques of stochastic approximation. Numerical examples are used to illustrate and corroborate our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large population interactions are ubiquitous in modern engineering systems and applications, for example, social networks [1] , crowdsourcing [2] , [3] and the Internet of Things (IoTs) [4] . Agents interact with each other in a complex environment, in which each agent makes strategic and dynamic decisions in response to the group of agents it interacts with. The group of agents can be random and changing over time. One useful tool to describe the dynamic evolution of population is evolutionary game theory [5] , [6] , which often assumes homogeneous and pairwise interactions between agents. This underlying assumption makes the classical framework insufficient to capture the network properties of the agents, and the heterogeneous local interactions among the players.
In this paper, we develop an evolutionary Poisson game framework which bridges the gap between the evolutionary game theory with the heterogeneity of the population. We enrich the game-theoretic model by incorporating network topology, the size of the population, and the epidemic process to establish a holistic framework that can be used to address the engineering applications of interest. These unique aspects of the model lead to a customized evolutionary stability equilibrium concept, and its corresponding replicator dynamics for describing the evolution of the population. The overarching goal of this work is to control the behaviors of the large population to achieve a system-wide objective. Building on the evolutionary Poisson game framework, we leverage the techniques of stochastic approximation to develop an online learning algorithm.
The convergence analysis of the controller involves the understanding of the coupled dynamics between the population and the learning algorithm. We show that the convergence is This work was partially supported by NSF grants (EFMA 1441140 and SES 1541164) and a grant from NYU Research Challenge Fund.
guaranteed under time scale separation and mild conditions on the step sizes. In addition, we use virus protection over a large-scale network as a motivating application to illustrate the link between the game-theoretic model and the application. We fully characterize the global control of the virus protection problem in network systems, and corroborate the results with numerical examples. We observe a phenomenon of heterogeneity induced confidence in which the protection rate decreases as heterogeneity of the population exceeds a certain threshold.
Large population behaviors have been investigated using models from evolutionary games [5] - [8] , Poisson games [9] , [10] , mean-field games [11] - [13] . These models have successfully captured different aspects of the large population. The evolutionary Poisson game developed in this work integrates the features of evolutionary games and Poisson games to form a more powerful framework to analyze and control systems with a large population of agents. From the perspective of applications, the optimal protection problem and epidemics spreading over networks has been recently investigated in [14] - [17] . The existing models are not sufficient yet to incorporate the topological information into a holistic epidemic and game model simultaneously. In this work, we aim to address this issue by proposing an integrated framework that can be used to broaden the scope of the applications and capture more pertinent features of the problem.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II, we describe the system model, and we develop in section III the evolutionary stable equilibrium concept and its associated replicator dynamics. In Section IV, we present a global control problem, and we provide in section V explicit results that completely characterize a class of virus protection problem. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VI and discuses future work. Due to the page limit of the paper, we remove the proofs of the results. The details of the proofs can be found in [18] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the large population game model, and discuss an application of epidemic protection in a heterogeneous population.
A. Random player game
Large scale interacting systems often involve a random number of interacting players. Poisson game is a natural framework to capture this phenomenon [9] , [10] , which has been successfully used to study decentralized resource allocation in networks [19] , [20] . A Poisson game Γ is mathematically defined by a five-tuple (λ, τ, r, C , u) where:
• λ corresponds to the mean number of players, typically λ >> 1, • T is the set of types of players and each one belongs to one type t ∈ T , • The probability of a player being of type t is given by r(t), and the number of players of type t is a Poisson random variable with parameter λr(t),
• C is the set of all pure actions available to all players,
• The utility of a player of type t is u t (a, x) with a is the pure action, and x is a vector of size |C | where x(b) is the number of players who choose action b in C .
The expected utility of a player of type t who plays action a while the rest of the players are expected to play using strategy σ is:
where Z(C ) denotes the set of elements w ∈ IR C such that w(c) is a non-negative integer for all c ∈ C . The decomposition property of the Poisson distribution yield:
If players play according to the strategy σ, σ t (c) is the probability that a player of type t chooses the pure action c. Finally, the expected utility whether a player chooses action θ ∈ ∆(C ) is:
Definition 1:
The strategy σ * is a pure Nash equilibrium if ∀t ∈ T, σ * ∈ B t (σ * ),
We can also extend this framework to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium by considering the set of mixed best responses ∆(B t (σ)).
B. Application to epidemic protection in heterogeneous population
Having defined the non-cooperative game in the context of heterogeneous interacting randomly individuals, we describe one application related to virus protection. Many recent works have ignored the topology of the interaction, the heterogeneity of the individuals or the selfishness of their decision in their models. In this work, we develop a holistic framework that can incorporate these features. We start by introducing the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemic model, which has been well-studied in the literature [21] and recently has gained lots of interests for modeling computer viruses propagation [22] , [23] .
Consider an SIS epidemics over a graph, there exists a limiting spreading factor rate, denoted by the critical epidemic threshold, below which the infection vanishes exponentially fast in time, and above which the critical threshold the network stays infected. In an in-homogeneous SIS epidemics, we can express the epidemic threshold of an individual effective spreading rate τ i of each node i. Indeed, it is has been shown in [24] that by using a mean-field approximation of the Markov process model for the epidemic, for the complete graph structure with N nodes, the critical threshold thus satisfies the following relation:
The contamination process of our SIS epidemic is a Poisson variable with rate β but our spreading framework is inhomogeneous as we consider that each node of type t has a recovery process with rate δ t .
We consider an individual protection strategic game where each player has a type, or private information which determines his recovery capability (e.g. the rate of recovery), and incomplete information (e.g., nodes are not aware of the number of players they interact with 1 ).
The set of pure actions of the players is C = {OFF, ON}, and the set Z(C ) = IN 2 . Players are characterized by their recovery rate δ t which depends on their type t. Then, the effective spreading rate for each type t player is τ t = β δ t . Based on the expression of the critical epidemic threshold for the heterogeneous SIS in a complete graph, we obtain a following necessary and sufficient condition over the effective spreading rates τ t and the number of nodes x t of type t that do not invest, in order for the infection to propagate in a complete graph:
Depending on the decision of each player, if the infection is propagated over the entire network, then the cost for a player that does not protect itself is K, otherwise its cost is 0. This cost may represent the restoring cost when a node is contaminated, or also this cost can be a penalty proposed by the system designer in order to control self-protection behavior. Then, the utility of a player of type t is given by:
In our framework, the type-t utility function is not defined over the set Z(C ) as in [10] but as follows:
In fact, the utility function in a Poisson game should depend on the total number of players choosing the same action over different types. In the model, we do not have such aggregative assumption in the utility, and the type as an impact on the utility function. For the same number of individuals that do not invest, i.e., take the action OFF, the utility of a player depends on the number of such individuals of each type. We then use the concept of random player game model proposed in [25] , which is a generalization of Poisson games. In fact, games with a random number of players are a natural extension of Bayesian games, which are a class of incomplete information games [26] .
We denote by X t the random variable which determines the number of players of type t that do not invest. Based on the decomposition property of the Poisson distribution, X t is a Poisson distribution with parameter λr(t)σ t (OFF). Then, the total number of players that do not invest is a Poisson distribution with parameter λ ∑ t r(t)σ t (OFF). If a node decides to be protected, he pays a cost C, i.e.,
Note that the utility functions do not depend on the type t of the user 2 . Here, we consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Denote by p the probability that a player (of any type) chooses action OFF, i.e., for all types t = 1, . . . , T , σ t (OFF) = p and σ t (ON) = 1 − p. The expected utility of a player who plays pure action OFF while all other players are expected to play according to a mixed strategy p depends on the realization vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x T ) of the random vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) by:
Based on the decomposition and aggregation properties of the Poisson distribution, we arrive at
Then, the expected utility of a player that does not invest in protection, in face of a population profile p is given by:
Finally, the expected utility from playing action q ∈ ∆(C ) is given by:
Based on Definition 1, a (symmetric) mixed Nash equilibrium p * for the protection game with a random number of player satisfies
Lemma 1: If C ≥ K, then the pure Nash equilibrium is p * = 1.
2 A similar analysis can be done for the case of type-dependent equilibrium
We next state the proposition that describes the mixed equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness): If the parameters of the system λ, C, K (with C < K), T , the type distribution r(·) and the effective spreading rates τ t satisfy the following condition:
Then, there exists one unique mixed Nash equilibrium. We have proved the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium depending on the parameters of the problem. Based on a simple geometric argument, as function F and G are continuous over the interval [0, 1], we can further show that the equilibrium p * is strictly decreasing in C (i.e., more expensive is the protection, less individuals will adapt the strategy OFF.), and it is also strictly decreasing with λ (i.e., the average number of individuals in each local interaction). Indeed, having more people in average at each interaction makes individuals more vulnerable, and then the protection rate (i.e., proportion of individuals protected) becomes higher at the equilibrium. A last important remark from the previous proposition is that the strategy ON cannot be a dominant strategy for any values of the parameters of the model. In fact, F(0) > G(0), and there is always a proportion of individuals that are not protected.
III. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND DYNAMICS
Another equilibrium concept, which is more robust than the Nash equilibrium and well adapted to large population games is called Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS). It is based on evolutionary principles that have been originally defined in [27] in biology, and recently applied to engineering and systems [8] . In this section, we will introduce the concept of ESS and its associated dynamics.
A. Evolutionary stability concept
ESS is a strategy such that, if adopted by all the players, is robust against deviations of a (possibly small) fraction of the population. From a biological point of view, it can be seen as a generalization of Darwin's idea of survival of the fittest, while from a game theory perspective, it is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium, which further satisfies a stability property.
It is important to note that a mixed strategy p can be also interpreted as the set of distributions of pure strategies among the players [5] . In our setting, the mixed strategy p can describe, assuming that each player plays a pure action in C , the proportion of players that choose the action OFF. This is also called the strategy profile of the population. Having this equivalent point of view of the game in mind, an ESS, if adopted by the whole population, is resistant to mutations of a small fraction of individuals in the population. Suppose that the whole population adopts a strategy q, and that a fraction ε of mutants deviate to strategy p. Strategy q is an ESS if ∀p = q, there exists some ε p > 0 such that ∀ε ∈ (0, ε p ):
In other words, this strict inequality says that an ESS defeats any small mutations (relative to ε) of the population profile.
In that sense, the equilibrium concept of ESS is said to be more robust than the Nash Equilibrium, because it is robust to the deviation of a fraction of players, and not only one.
B. Dynamics
Another way to describe how a population reaches a stable situation is through the replicator dynamics, which highlights the role of selection from a dynamic perspective. It is formalized by a system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs), and it establishes that the evolution of the size of the populations depends on the fitness they achieve during interactions. A strategy will sustain if its fitness is higher than the fitness averaged over all the strategies used in the whole population. The folk theorem of evolutionary games allows to establish a strict connection between the stable points of the replicator dynamics (RD) and the Nash equilibria [7] .
In our context, the RD equation can be formalized as follows:ṗ
We have the results from the folk theorem of the replicator dynamics in population games that an interior rest point of the dynamics is a Nash equilibrium of our game. Then, we can describe the equilibrium, as a rest point of a dynamical system. This provides an important insight for a global control of the system. We will see in the next section that this approach can be used to determine a two time-scale process to optimize a global performance of the system without computing explicitly the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we prove in the next proposition that any rest point of our dynamics is not only a Nash equilibrium but also an ESS. In our setting, we have the following result.
Proposition 2: If our game has a unique mixed equilibrium p * , then it is an ESS and it corresponds to the unique interior rest point of the ODEs (3).
The discrete-time version of the replicator dynamics is described as follows:
Let timescale parameter b(n) be
then, as n tends to infinity, the discrete-time iteration (4) is an approximation of the replicator dynamics ODE given by (3).
IV. ONLINE GLOBAL CONTROL
The overarching goal of this work is to design a global control for the entire heterogeneous, stochastic interacting population. As an example of global objective function for the controller, we consider in this section the global revenue. Moreover, we propose an online learning process as we assume that the infected cost K is not known by the controller. This parameter is highly related to how individuals evaluate the cost of being infected, or by definition, it is difficult to estimate it correctly. We then propose an online learning algorithm so that a controller can optimize a global function of the equilibrium population without knowing this parameter. We use the average revenue as a global function given by
where p * (C) is the equilibrium considering the control parameter C. Its goal is to maximize this function depending on the price C. Based on simulations, we observe that the equilibrium p * depends on the cost C as an S-shaped function, concave and strictly convex. Particularly, for C high enough, i.e., C > K 2 , the equilibrium is strictly convex in C. Then, there exists a price C 0 such that for all C > C 0 , the function p * (C) is strictly convex. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The revenue R(C) of the provider is strictly concave for C ∈ [C 0 , K].
Based on this result, a gradient algorithm can be used to converge to the optimal price C * that maximizes the revenue of the provider. In fact, we have the existence and uniqueness of an optimal price. Designing a gradient algorithm in this case needs to estimate the gradient function of the revenue since there is no closed form expression of the equilibrium function. We therefore propose to use Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) [28] as follows:
where ∆ is a random variable such that
, and δ is a small constant. One sample form of this approximation is proposed in [29] . However, it has been observed that this single-sample form of SPSA introduces a significant bias, and therefore in general we use its twosample form, given by equation (5) .
Given that for a fixed price C the replicator dynamics has a global asymptotically stable equilibrium p * (C), our algorithm converges to the optimal price. Considering a starting price C 0 , we then consider the following approximate gradient descent algorithm ∀n = 0, 1, . . . ,:
where a(n) is the update step size, a discrete random variable ∆ n at each step n such that
We can then define for all n the following functions:
Then, the approximate stochastic gradient descent can be written as:
where M n is a martingale difference sequence. The update step-size parameter a(n) has to be efficiently designed in order to guarantee the convergence to the global optimal solution. Indeed, the control update has to wait for the convergence of the replicator dynamics to the equilibrium. Therefore, there is a relation between the speeds of the two dynamical processes. For a fixed C, the equilibrium p * (C) is a global attractor, which is also a global asymptotically stable equilibrium of the replicator dynamics. Indeed, the SPSA is coupled with the replicator dynamics.We have the following proposition that yields conditions on the step-size update of the gradient algorithm for achieving the optimal solution. Proposition 3: If we have the following conditions:
The last proposition provides conditions on the time scale of the gradient algorithm to ensure that the coupled algorithm converges to the optimal solution of the global control problem.
V. COMPLETE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE VIRUS PROTECTION GLOBAL CONTROL PROBLEM
We consider 2 types of individuals in a population, i.e., T = 2. We then have r(1) := r (i.e., the proportion of type-1 individuals in the population) and r(2) := 1 − r (i.e., the proportion of type-2 individuals). Individuals from each type differ in their capacity (e.g. recovery rate τ) to recover from the virus. We let τ 1 < τ 2 , which means that δ 1 > δ 2 , i.e., type-1 individuals are more resilient to the virus and it takes generally less time for them to react and then to recover.
1) Equilibrium Paradox: When r is close to 0 (resp. 1), i.e., only type-2 (resp. type-1) individuals form the population, we observe in Fig. 1 the impact of both heterogeneity parameters λ and the type distribution r(·) on the equilibrium. Specifically, for the reason of convenience, we show the percentage of people protecting themselves (i.e., the protection rate) which corresponds to 1− p * . We can observe that the average number of interacting individuals, which is equal to λ, has a positive impact on the protection rate inside the population. For the same heterogeneity type given by a distribution r(·), the protection rate is strictly increasing with λ. It is obvious that, when each individual interacts with more individuals in average, it makes individuals more vulnerable to the contagion, and then requires a higher level of protection. Comparing λ = 2 (e.g. a population with mostly pairwise interactions as in standard evolutionary game framework) and λ = 10, we can observe that the protection rate is strictly higher only when the proportion of type-2 individuals is higher than around 80%. This means that under this threshold type proportion, individuals do not feel in a risky environment even if the number of interacting individuals is large (i.e., λ = 10). When λ becomes even larger, another interesting property arises. From Fig. 1 , we can observe that, for parameter λ = 20, the impact of the heterogeneity type is significant. By increasing the heterogeneity from r = 0 (only type-2 individuals), the protection rate decreases. In fact, increasing the heterogeneity in our scenario means that we reduce the proportion of type-2 individuals meanwhile increasing the proportion of type-1 individuals.
As we further increase the value r, the phenomenon of heterogeneity induced confidence principle arises. A highly heterogeneous population leads to a decreasing the protection rate as the heterogeneity reaches the percentage value around 20 % of type-2. Moreover, this threshold seems be independent of the average number of individuals in each local interaction.
2) Convergence of the Replicator Dynamics: In Fig. 2 , the replicator dynamics equation is illustrated for two different starting points and also for different values of the average interaction size λ. This result confirms the convergence of the ODE to the equilibrium and also that the equilibrium is decreasing with the parameter λ. In fact, the protection rate is by definition the proportion of individuals that are protected, i.e., 1 − p * . Then, we can observe on Fig. 1 that for r = 0.1 and λ = 10, the protection rate of the population is 0.13, which corresponds to the rest point of the replicator dynamics in long dashed line. This result is corroborated for the case where λ = 20 and the protection rate is then 0.56, we obtain that the replicator dynamics converge to 0.44.
3) Global optimization and learning algorithm: Finally, we illustrate the global control design problem.
We show in Fig. 3 the result of our learning mechanism for several control updates with step size a(n) = 1 1+n log(n) , a(n) = 1 n and a(n) = 1 n 2 , respectively. The first control update satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3. We can observe that for this control update, our learning algorithm converges to the optimal control, whereas the two other control updates do not. The last control update a(n) = 1 n 2 gives a too fast update of the control and finally converges to the control value which is far from the optimal one, and therefore, the revenue at this value is far from the optimal revenue. VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have first described a framework of large population game with heterogeneous types of individuals, in which local interactions involve a random number of individuals of different types. We have developed the concept of evolutionary stability equilibrium as a solution that characterizes the game behavior. A decentralized virus protection problem has been used to motivate and illustrate this framework. In order to achieve desirable outcome of the game, we have developed methodologies to design a global controller for this dynamic heterogeneous population game. In particular, the interdependency between the global control and the population behaviors has been analyzed using coupled dynamics between approximate stochastic gradient algorithms with the replicator dynamics. We have shown the convergence of our learning algorithm, and provided numerical illustrations to demonstrate the impact of the heterogeneity on the outcome of the system. 
